Introduction
With the development of internet technology, the harmfulness of malware is increasing. The statistic results [1] presented by Symantec show that, in 2010, more than 3 billion malicious attacks are recorded, more than 280 million malware variant samples are monitored, and the web attacks increase 93% compared to 2009. Intrusion detection technique becomes a hot research field of information security. The malware analysis method is the key problem in intrusion detection technique. In the literature, the main approach branches of malware analysis method are content-based static analysis and behavior-based dynamic analysis.
Content-based static analysis approach aims at the binary content of target executable code, analyzes the malware through the content characteristic comparison, without executing the malware code. Researchers proposed a lot of approaches and system for content-based static malware analysis [2, 3, 4, 5] . But, as Moser mentioned in [6] , the content-based static malware analysis method have a lot of defects, in which the most one is that, obfuscation and concealing technique bring a significant obstacle [2, 7, 8] . Moser also showed that the generic analysis of obfuscated code is NP-hard.
Behavior-based dynamic analysis approach executes malware code in a controlled environment which is called Sandbox. During the execution of malware, the operations and system status are monitored and recorded to the behavior report. The malware's behavior pattern is studied by using the behavior report. Compared to content-based static analysis, the behavior-based dynamic analysis can mine the actual execution logic of malware. Moreover, the dynamic analysis can reveal the behavior characteristic more effectively and has potentiality to resist the interference caused by obfuscation and concealing technique. Therefore, academia and industry both pay great attention to the behavior-based dynamic malware analysis.
Behavior-based dynamic malware analysis technique architecture consists of malware samples collection, malware execution & monitoring environment and behavior characteristics model establishing and behavior analysis (clustering, classification, recognition and detection etc.). The research of malware collection and malware execution and monitoring method has achieved a mature result. Some malware collection systems and methods are proposed based on honeypot, such as Nepenthes [9] , ScriptGen [10] , Argos [11] . Meanwhile, the malware execution and monitoring method developed significantly in the past few years through the development of API Hooking [12] and virtualization technique. Typical systems such as Anubis [13, 14] , BitBlaze [15] , CWSandbox [16] , JoeSandbox 1 , NormanSandbox 2 or ThreatExpert 3 , execute malware code in an controlled environment and monitor the behavior of malware, finally generate behavior report for each malware. The information in behavior report mentioned above is original, the depth analyses are necessary for revealing the behavior characteristics and malware detection. Two main concepts for automatic analysis of behavior have been proposed: clustering and classification. Although several research progresses are achieved to a certain degree recently in [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] , there are shortcomings in accuracy and performance. The main reason is that previous work lacks of a precise malware behavior similarity model which is used to describe the behavior pattern and characteristic.
In this paper, we discussed the malware behavior characteristic, and analyze the operation similarity and the random factors which interfere with the similarity analysis. Then we applied the Naive Bayes machine learning model in our approach, proposed a malware classification approach based on Naive Bayes machine learning model. Compared to previous work, our approach is more concerned about the accurateness and robustness of the behavior similarity description model. Moreover we improve the analysis performance through the application of Naive Bayes classifier. To verify the effectiveness of our method, we designed and implemented automatic malware behavior classifier prototype called MalwareFilter. In case study, we evaluated the prototype using behavior sequence reports which were generated through true malware. The experiment results show that our approach is effective, and the performance of training and classification is improved through the introduction of Naive Bayes.
Naive Bayes Behavior Classification Model
Naive Bayes is one of the most practical model in bayes machine learning. Mitchell introduces bayes learning methods in detail in book [24] . Michie, Spiegelhalter, et al practiced in-depth study for Naive Bayes machine learning model in [25] , and they compared Naive Bayes classification model with other learning algorithm, such as neural network and decision tree. Their study result shows that Naive Bayes's performance is as good as other models in most cases, and is better in some cases. One typical application of Naive Bayes is text document classification. Lewis [26] , Lang [27] and Joachims [28] firstly proposed text document classification approach based on Naive Bayes which is the most effective method for text document classification currently.
The processing objective of malware behavior classification is the system call oriented behavior report which is generated through behavior monitoring. Most monitoring systems provide the report in XML format and the contents of the report are the system call name, parameter list, return value and other additional information. Inspired by the application of Naive Bayes in text documentation classification, we applied Naive Bayes in our approach for malware behavior classification. The Naive Bayes algorithm that we shall present applies in the following general setting. Consider the instance space R consisting of all malware behavior monitoring reports. We are given training examples of some unknown target function f(r), which can take on any value from the finite set C. The target function f is considered classifying unknown behavior reports as known category. The target value set consists of known categories' name.
The task of our general setting is to learn from the training set to predict the target value for subsequent behavior report. There are two key issues involved in applying the Naive Bayes classifier to our behavior classification problem that first to decide how to represent the behavior monitoring result in terms of attribute values, and second to decide how to estimate the probabilities required by the Naive Bayes model.
The Attribute Values of Malware Behavior
The simplest and most direct way to represent the behavior monitoring result in terms of attribute values is that define one attribute for each location in system call sequence and the attribute value is the name of system call which is in the location represented by the attribute. But, the system call information which used to record malware behavior is multi-dimension and consists of system call name, parameter list, return value and other additional information. Using the system call name alone to represent the attribute is not enough to describe the behavior pattern completely and accurately. Therefore, we used full information to represent the attribute values. The malware behavior attribute value is defined as follows: (4) Where ATTRr represents the attribute value n-tuple of report r and attri represents the attribute value in location i of report r. The above attribute value definition way expresses the behavior information most completely, but it ignores the interference brought by the random factors (mentioned in section 3), so it can't characterize the malware behavior accurately. Therefore, we proposed the similarity validity window mechanism which can avoid effectively the interference brought by random factors and improve the behavior similarity description ability of the attribute value representation way.
Probabilities Estimation Required by Naive Bayes
After defining attribute values of malware behavior monitoring result, we need to handle of the issue that how to estimate the probabilities required by the Naive Bayes. According to the Naive Bayes formula [24] , the target value output by the Naive Bayes malware behavior classifier is:
Where vNB denotes the target value generated by the Naive Bayes classifier. It means that, the objective behavior report's maximum probability of system call sequence which is observed in the corresponding location in all training sample categories. The category which generates the maximum probability is the target classification result cobj. According to the above formula, we need to calculate P(cj) and P(attri|cj) to get vNB. The probability P(cj) can easily be estimated based on the fraction of each class in the training data.
On the other hand, P(attri|cj) denotes the probability of observing the attri in location i under cj in the training set. P(attri|cj) can also be expressed as P(attri=oper_infok | cj) which denotes the probability of observing the oper_infok as an operation information item in location i under known category cj. The operation information item is a string which is consist of system call name, parameter list, return value, executing state and additional information and separated by a specific character. According the analysis by Mitchell in [24] , we assumed that the probability of encountering a specific operation information oper_infok is independent of the specific position being considered. That is :
Therefore P(attri=oper_infok | cj) can be converted to a position-independent probability P(oper_infok | cj). This conversion reduces the quantity of probability estimation required by Naive Bayes significantly. In general, the estimate for P(oper_infok | cj) will be:
Where totalj is the total number of sequence positions in all training examples whose category name is cj, numkj is the number of times operation information oper_infok is found among these totalj sequence positions. To handle the issue of biased underestimate probability dominating the Naive Bayes classifier, we introduced the m-estimate [24] to avoid the occurrence of biased underestimate probability trough the uniform prior estimate. Hence the estimate for P(oper_infok | cj) is updated as:
Where OPER_DICTIONARY is the operation dictionary which consists of all the different operating information in training set, -OPER_DICTIONARY-is the size of operation dictionary.
Evaluation
To prove the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach, we designed and implemented the prototype of malware behavior classifier based on Naive Bayes called MalwareFilter, then evaluated the prototype using behavior monitoring results generated by real malware samples. The experiment results showed that our approach is effective and the overall load of training and classifying processes is reduced significantly through the introduction of Naive Bayes. Our experiment platform is a Linux Ubuntu 10.10 machine with a dual-core Intel 2.4GHz CPU and 4GB RAM.
Experiment Data
The experiment data in the evaluation is the behavior reports generated by malware monitoring system CWSandbox, and the experiment data are from Trinius . The total quantity of malware behavior reports is 36816 which divided into 442 reference categories, and the largest and the smallest categories' size are 5994 and 1 respectively. The statistic information of all behavior reports, such as file size, operation sequence quantity, the number and rate of network operation, file operation and registry operation, et al are as follows: We chose the categories whose size is greater than 100 as valid experiment data. Finally, the valid experiment data contain 36 categories. The category names and quantities of valid experiment data are as follows: 
Classification Quality Evaluation
First of all, we chose a part of reports randomly from complete data set to compose the training set. In order to evaluate the classification quality more comprehensively, we performed different training set extraction methods. The two extraction methods are as follows:
Where Numbercj is the quantity of reports which belong category cj, INT is round down function. The first training set extraction method is called Proportional Extracting with Fixed Upper and Lower Limits and the second one is called Proportional Extracting without Limits. Two extraction methods share the same extraction ratio 10%. In particular, the first extraction method guarantees that any category's size is reasonable (neither too small nor too large) for training process in training set. The numbers and distributions of categories in training set extracted using method 1 are shown as follows: After training of MalwareFilter using the two training set extraction methods, we performed classification experiments on the test set. The classification results are shown in the following figure which describes the classification accuracy rate of each reference category. The result shows that, the classification effect is better in the Proportional Extracting with Fixed Upper and Lower Limits mode. In general, the more training samples we extract the better classification effect we get. The number of behavior reports which are classified successfully under training set 1 is 19090 (the total number of test set is 22755), the average accuracy rate arrives 83.89%, the highest accuracy rate is 95.38%, and there are four reference categories whose classification accuracy rates arrive above 90%. 
Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the prototype, we performed several workloads and measure their execution times and memories for different training sets. The training sets shared the same extracting method which was Proportional Extracting with Fixed Upper and Lower Limits. So different training sets shared the same size, but the report samples in sets are different. We performed 4 runs and chose the average of all runs as the final performance result. The evaluation results are as follows: The results show that, compared to other methods such as neural network, decision tree and support vector machine, et al, our malware behavior classification approach based on Naive Bayes improves the efficiency of training, and the approach provides a performance guarantee for the large-scale application of malware behavior classification.
Conclusions and Future works
Aiming at the defect of malware classification in accurateness and performance, this paper revealed the fact that, previous work can't give a precise behavior description model which is used to express the characteristic and similarity of malware behavior. Moreover, the behavior description model can't handle the interference brought by random factors. After the analyses of malware behavior characteristics, operation similarity and some random factors, the paper proposed a system call oriented automatic malware classification approach based on Naive Bayes. Compared to previous work, our approach is more concerned about the accurateness and robustness of the behavior similarity description model, and we improve the analysis performance through introducing a better learning model Naive Bayes. Moreover, we use the configurable valid window mechanism to handle the interference brought by random factors. To verify our approach, we designed and implemented the prototype called MalwareFilter and evaluated the prototype with exhaustive dataset. The results show that our approach is effective and efficient, and overall load of training and classification processes is reduced significantly through the introduction of Naive Bayes.
The main limitation of our approach is that: a) the behavior analysis data are generated by the CWSandbox which doesn't support multi-path execution of malware binaries; b) on the other hand, the classification process lacks of the recognition of novel category that reduces the extensibility of the approach. Future work will be devoted to implementing the multi-path execution supported malware behavior monitoring environment and achieving the dynamic clustering during the classification process by using incremental analysis method and introducing the Naive Bayes probability threshold.
